

## METHODS AND DIDACTICS

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### SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PROVERBIAL DISCOURSE: A KA:RMİK LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

In the discussion of proverbial speech act theory, not much work has been done except a few articles as those of Norrick (1994). Moreover, the causal motivation of *how the choice* of multiple *speech acts affects the local, sequentially emergent basis for discourse by creating (dispositional) options for a next utterance each time they are performed* and its consequent effect on the emergent structure of discourse is not analyzed so far. In addition, the *choice* of the type of the speech act (e.g., direct vs indirect; assertive/directive/ commissives / expressive / declaration; proverbial vs non-proverbial, etc.) also affects the structure of discourse. In view of the recently proposed ka:rmik linguistic theory (Bhuaneswar 2010a, b, c) which considers language as a resource for the construction of dispositional reality at the level *roundabout (middle)*, it is possible to look at speech acts as dispositionally produced by human beings *by living* in a context and used dispositionally *for living* in the context and provide a principled account of how speech acts are *chosen*, and how *their choice* in turn contributes to the emergent discourse structure.

In this paper, an attempt is made to briefly motivate how such choices are made and how these choices affect the nature of the emergent discourse structure.

**Key words:** discourse, ka:rmik theory, speech act, structure, proverb, choice, account.

## II. Literature Review

Austin (1962) formulated the speech act theory which states that language is used to perform actions and its insights focus on how meaning and action are related to language. Searle (1969: 19 – 21) builds upon Austin's work by providing an additional propositional act (referring and predicating function) to the already proposed locutionary ("utterance", which utters an expression in the case of Searle), illocutionary (the act performed in "saying" the locution), and perlocutionary ("consequential effects" of an utterance on H) acts. More importantly, he (P.21) incorporates the speech act into linguistic theory as "the basic unit of communication" through his principle of expressibility: "The principal that whatever can be meant can be said" (P.19) – enabling us to "equate rules for performing speech acts with results for uttering certain linguistic elements" (P.20). In contrast to Austin, Searle classifies rules and conditions into "constitutive" and "regulative" rules according to text and context.

Searle relies on taxonomic principles for the classification of speech acts – unlike Austin – on a two-tier basis: first, he proposes "five classes of speech acts: *representatives* (eg. Asserting), *directives* (eg. Requesting), *commissives* (eg. Promising), *expressives* (eg. Thanking), and *declarations* (eg. Appointing) (Schiffrin 1994:57) which are differentiated by the principles of:

1. illocutionary point;

2. words-world fit;
3. psychological state;

next, other speech acts within these classes are differentiated by less comprehensively applicable principles:

1. differing strengths of the illocutionary point;
2. status of S and H ;
3. propositional content condition.

He further distinguishes speech acts into direct and indirect speech acts where the latter refer to the multiple functions (primary and secondary illocutionary acts – Searle 1986: 34) performed by an utterance.

The different conditions proposed by Searle are:

- 1 *propositional content conditions* (concerning reference and predication);
- 2 *preparatory conditions* (involving background circumstances and knowledge about S and H);
- 3 *sincerity conditions* (concerning the psychological state of S (such as intention, belief, desire and any exclamation – state) as it is expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act); and
- 4 *the essential conditions* (concerning the illocutionary ‘point’ of the act or what the utterance ‘counts as’) (cf. Schiffrin 1994:56).

The contribution of speech act theory to discourse analysis is in:

- 1 the segmentation of the text into units of speech acts with the help of the four speech act conditions mentioned above ;
- 2 and the expectation that speech acts set up by creating “options for a next utterance each time they are performed, and thus provide a local, sequentially emergent basis for discourse” (Schiffrin 1994:91) ; and
- 3 the identification of speech acts per se into direct and indirect speech acts which is critical to establishing coherence in sequences.

However, the identification of speech acts is problematic since the conditions for two speech acts may be similar as in the case of, say, questions and requests (cf. *ibid* 71) leading to alternative interpretations as exemplified in the case of : ‘*Y’want a piece of candy?*’ as *a question*, as *a request and an offer* (*ibid* 59-85) followed by ‘No’ as *an answer*, *a compliance*, and *a refusal*. Nonetheless, not all texts yield to such multiple interpretations and there will be a cross-matching of the speech acts producing incoherence /misunderstanding if multiple interpretations are sought. The coherence/ misunderstanding will come out if only the intentionality of the Speaker / Hearer is known from their dispositional psychological knowledge and not from the textual representation.

### **III. Analysis of Speech Act Theory: Towards Ka:rmik Proverbial Discourse Analysis**


As pointed out in the Introduction, according to the Ka:rmik Linguistic Theory, language is *dispositional action* instead of mere *mental*, or *social*, or *cognitive action*. As such, disposition (*svabha:vam*) generates, specifies, directs, materializes and impels the use of lingual action in all its variety, range, and depth and consequently *the choice of speech acts* and *the coherence and structure of discourse* also.

Let us see briefly how it is done by doing a discourse analysis of a few *real life* proverbial exchanges in the ka:rmik linguistic paradigm with a graph and 5 networks given below.

#### **3. 1. The Role of Svabha:vam in the G – S - D – M of a Proverbial Exchange**

Svabha:vam is critical in the G-S-D-M (generation-specification-direction-materialization) of lingual action by substantiation and qualification through its complex of traits-knowledge-va:sana:s operating through the physical-mental-cultural-linguistic media of lingual action and the

ka:rmik pragmatic constraints of the socioculturalspiritual (SCS) context. When Consciousness reflects in Disposition and it gets charged with awareness, it becomes activated like a programmed machine with current flowing in it. *First*, this Consciousness-qualified- Disposition (C-q-D) generates impulsions which activate the traits to produce dispositional bias which in turn produces response bias for choosing *this or that* action to be *so and so* in *such and such* manner by the knowledge component through desire and springs effort through va:sana:s for performing lingual action in a concerned context. This is a very complex process that involves choices from the networks of Svabha:vam (Network 1), Contextual Action (Network 2, 3, 4), and Lingual Action (not given here owing to space constraints but see Bhuvanewar 2009 for detailed networks of semantics, and syntax): Svabha:vam chooses contextual and lingual actions, and the experience of the results of action; contextual action decides the choice of the Move – Speech Act – Exchange – Transaction; and lingual action the function-content-form. *Second*, the desire not only implies the desire for something but also the form-content-function of the action to be performed for fulfilling the desire. *Third*, both the form and content are cognized dispositionally along with the function as a **Cogneme** by Socioculturalspiritual Dispositional Cognition as captured in the TGCA Graphs 1 and 2. The Cogneme is like a seed ((the (lingual) action to be unfolded in the context) that contains the sprout (the pattern and structure of the lingual action in the context) which gradually evolves into the tree (the utterance in the context). When a lingual action is so chosen and performed (as proverbial +non-proverbial lingual action in a Proverbial Exchange), it not only produces variation but also (proverbially) coordinates the coordination of triple action and gives results at the same time.



**Network 1. Network of Svabha:vam in Conversational Exchange**

The human being experiences the results of the (proverbially) coordinated action – be it merely lingual action (e.g., casual conversation) or mixed physical-mental-lingual action (e.g., group hunting) – as a ka:rmik actor. He experiences pleasure as he fulfills his desires or pain if he does not or simply witnesses the results. To put it differently, proverbial lingual action is used as a resource for the construction of proverbial dispositional reality which transforms into the ultimate experiential ka:rmik reality. This process is captured in two fundamental equations of the Principle of Action and the Principle of Choice as given below:


- (1) Principle of Action: Disposition → Desire → Effort → Action → Result → Experience
- (2) Principle of Choice: Disposition → Dispositional Bias → Response Bias → Choice

→ **Variation in Action** → [Result → Experience].

As we notice, disposition is the cause for producing the desire, effort, action, and experience except the result which is determined by the resolution of contextual action. Within action, again, it influences its form-content-function-cognition in their variety-range-depth.

**3.2. Contextual Action and Its Choice**

In the Network 2a, the 5 possible options of A and B talking, listening, talking at the same time (overlap), talking in turns, and keeping quiet are captured while in 2b, they are explained in more detail. Once disposition produces a desire to perform lingual action and coordinate the coordination of the concerned action, the speaker makes a choice from the simple talk options in Network 2: either to talk or talk at the same time or talk in turn; in a similar way, he will also make further choices as shown in the basic interaction network in Network 2.




**Network 2: Network of Talking Options**


If there are two (or more) interlocutors and they are dispositionally impelled to enter into conversation and construct a proverbial exchange, they have to make a number of choices at the levels of Move – Speech Act – Exchange – Transaction. At the level of Move, the concerned interlocutor has to make a choice among the choices to: 1. Initiate; 2. Suspend; 3. Continue; 4. Complete; 5. Respond; and 6. Recur a move. Correspondingly, he will produce a speech act and again at the level of speech action, he has to make a choice among the choices to: 1. Initiate; 2. Continue; 3. End; and 4. Suspend (the Suspended Exchange) speech action. At the same time, the interlocutor will have to choose the type and structure of the speech act. Finally as the interlocutors engage themselves in the coordination of coordination of action, turns, exchanges, and a transaction gradually evolve in their variety, range, and depth with proverbs at the appropriate slots if they are chosen.

In Network 3, the entire process of an (proverbial) exchange is captured in a basic network which can be extended to include higher delicacies of options. In this network, A and B are chosen to represent a proverbial conversation. As they are impelled by their dispositions, they get a desire to enter into a conversation and construct an exchange. To do so, they make moves and produce proverbial and non-proverbial speech acts in their concerned turns and construct an exchange for coordinating the coordination of their action to fulfill their desires and experience the results of their action.

In Network 4, the different types of speech acts are networked. The speech acts can be direct, indirect, proverbial and non-proverbial on the one hand and they can be assertive, directive, commissive, repetitive, expressive, declarative, and materializing speech acts in terms of their functions; in addition, they can be simple (micro-speech act), where only one act, which is the main speech act, is performed and compound, and complex (macro-speech acts) where more than one speech act is performed. In such cases, the speech acts can be main or secondary speech acts. The way in which the speech acts are arranged as performative or non-performative speech acts in a turn gives the order of the speech acts.



**Network 3: The Network of Dispositional Choice in an Exchange**



**Network 4: Network of Type and Order of Speech Acts**


### 3.3. Cogneme - Cognition

In the Graph 1 given below, there are four quadrants. In each quadrant, the same bold/normal components of the vertical and horizontal axes *resolve* to produce the resultant diagonal axis component by the action of the Consciousness-qualified-Disposition (C-q-D) in D-q-C (Disposition-qualified-Consciousness). The first, second, and fourth quadrants impact on C-q-D to generate the third quadrant and what is cognized as *a concept* of the cogneme of the speech act in the third quadrant (the first inner circle) is further materialized by a superimposition of the linguistic form – first as its *structured pattern*, next as its *patterned structure (the medial circle)*, and finally as its *form in sound (the outer circle)* in the context as *lingual action of the contextual action* as shown above.

Graph 1: Combined Triaxial Graphs of Cognitive Actionality (TGCA) Quadrants

#### Legend

- ☆ The Individual Consciousness (the Being in the Human Being or the soul or the *ji:va*)
- △ The Triad (*sattva* giving knowledge of activity; *rajas* giving choice of activity by traits; and *tamas* giving inertia or materiality of activity by *va:sana:s*) of Disposition
- Horizontal Line; | Vertical Line; / Diagonal Line: Horizontal, Vertical, and Diagonal Axes;
- I, II, III, and IV : the quadrants 1, 2, 3, and 4
- ↷ gives rise to
- s 1. inner (*pasyanthi* 'cognitive'); 2. medial (*madhyama* 'pattern'); 3. outer (*vaikhari* 'form or phonic') levels of realization of language



TGCA Graph 1: Combined Triaxial Quadrants of Cognitive Actionality; 2. Materialization of Lingual Action

#### 3.3.1. Illustration by an Example

[A (Me) and B (Robin Fawcett) were going on a sightseeing trip in Hyderabad in 1999. B, a famous linguist, knows that I am doing research on proverbs. We hired an auto to the famous Golconda Fort but missed the way and passed through Kutub Shahi Tombs, another historical sight. When we reached the Tombs, the following conversation occurred.]

- (1a) A (Me): It is good that we have come this way.  
 B (Robin Fawcett): Every cloud has a silver lining.  
 A: Oh, you used a proverb!  
 B: Because of you.

A has a personality *trait* (*guNa*) to save face and an internalized habit (*va:sana*) to do so in contextual action informed by *knowledge* of such situations and hence A *wanted* (desired out of a *sa:ttvik-ra:jasik* temperament) with *a purpose* to mitigate the inconvenience caused by taking the wrong route (*contextual action*) in an apologetic tone in a *semi-loud, middle-pitched voice* in a culture sensitive speech act and accordingly chooses *an initiating move* (Network 3) in an *A/B Talk in Turn* option (Network 2) by *a vocal proposal*. Then he continues to coordinate the coordination of action – for constructing his dispositional reality, that is, to *get out of* the embarrassment (*dispositional choice* of a desire: *cause*) by a dispositional impulsion from the *Consciousness-qualified-Disposition (C-q-D)* in the *Disposition-qualified-Consciousness (D-q-C)* as shown by the upward diagonal arrow in the Ist Quad-

rant in Graph 1. Consequently, he wanted to fulfill it through *the means* of language, acquired through an interface of society and culture as an aspect of his spirituality/world view and made an appropriate *move* as shown by the downward diagonal arrow in the II Quadrant which superimposes on the desire shown in Quadrant I; then he *chose* the specific *non-proverbial type of direct, assertive, complex, micro-main speech act which is non-performative and single* (see Networks 3, 4): “*It is good that we have come this way.*” by its cognition as a *cogneme* through an interface of him (A) as one of the participants in an interpersonal relation to the other (B) in that context as shown by the upward end arrow in the III Quadrant and *ends* the *move* and the *turn by pausing*. Therefore, *the cause* for generating this speech act is (a trait from) disposition: *save face*; had he not been dispositionally inclined to mitigate the inconvenience, he would not have said it and this conversational exchange would not have taken place at all as already explained in equation (2).


In addition, it is not only specified to fulfill this desire but also directed in *the context* at the appropriate time, place, and manner as contextual action as pointed out by the upward end arrow and finally materialized and used as lingual action to bring in the expected result and its experience as shown by the downward end arrow in the IV Quadrant in the Graph 2. The materialization of the speech act from its unmanifest conception-to-semi-manifest pattern and structure-to-material form (utterance) is shown by the three materialization circles in Graph 2 and equation (1).

This ka:rmik process of lingual action cognition and its materialization applies across the board for any and every type of lingual action with appropriate mappings. In real life, this process takes place in a star network as explained in KLT.

### 3.4. The Star Network of KLT

A star network is a simulation of the cognition process in a human being. Consciousness is luminosity and it is enveloped by Individual Nature (Avidya). It is shown by a spot enclosed in a triangle whose three points indicate sattva (luminosity), rajas (activity), and tamas (inertia) (see Graph I). The Individual Nature (Avidya) is limited – as opposed to the Cosmic Nature which is infinite - and is the karmaphalam of the individual human being (ji:va). In KLT, it is **the Given** as a human being is born (without reference to the fruit-bearing impressions of his past actions in his previous lives, in a non-religious conception – the causality of the Given and rebirth are beyond the scope of KLT). This karmaphalam apparently transforms into the svabha:vam (disposition) of the individual as he is conceived and born in a context. Since then it *evolves* gradually into what it is as a complex of [traits-knowledge-va:sana:s], of inclinations-information-internalized habits, in the spatiotemporalmaterial-socioculturalspiritual context of his living. What is genetically inherited is *the Given*; what is contextually resolved is *the Evolved*. Therefore, the svabha:vam of a newborn baby is what is given and the svabha:vam of a person after birth till his death is what is evolved. This svabha:vam is an autopoietic, dissipative structure and remains constant for long periods by forming couplings with the environment until new bifurcation points emerge when it changes into a new form.

From birth-to-death, it is svabha:vam that generates-specifies-directs-materializes all the three types of triple activity (mental-vocal-physical) to fulfill one’s desires which is again g-s-d-med by svabha:vam as captured in equations (1) and (2). The complexity of human disposition gives rise to complex dispositional functional pressure (DFP) to create, perform, and experience complex activity. Human beings needed to coordinate the coordination of complex action and so they created language to solve this problem. Again, they have invested the language they have created with speech functions, called speech acts by Searle, to coordinate the coordination of action by *representing, directing, promising, expressing, and declaring* action. Furthermore, they have created proverbs and made proverbial speech acts to perform these functions proverbially to fulfill their desires for their experience through proverbial actional reality.



**Legend:** D Disposition; C Context; L Lingual Action; R Representative; E Expressive; Dec Declaration  
**Network 5. Star Network in Operation: Speech Act Cogneme – Cognition**

Consciousness is always enveloped – as it were – by this svabha:vam. This Disposition-qualified-Consciousness (D-q-C) is Awareness which is luminosity and hence a star is chosen to represent this. When Disposition is charged with Awareness, it shines like a star emitting twinkles of processes as flashes of memory – similar to an iron ball heated and glowing. This C-q-D can *think-decide-experience* as well as sustain these processes by *binding* them through the mind and heart. For example, when the *ji:va* (human being) desires to enter into a conversation, his awareness flashes like a star emitting as it were three knowledge-twinkles of disposition, contextual action, and lingual action in a planetary orbit; Again, each of them will flash its own knowledge-twinkles in a satellite orbit: disposition flashes three twinkles of traits-knowledge-*va:sana:s*; contextual action flashes four twinkles of move-speech act-exchange-transaction; lingual action flashes five twinkles of form-content-function-style-context; and so on to the last delicacy of the process - these twinkles form the nodes of choices in a systemic network. By **automaticity** that path which produces a particular speech act is interconnected-interrelated- (made) interdependent (I-I-Ied) to cognize that utterance by disposition (as in Network 3) and it is uttered. For example, in the exchange (1a), the speech act of B in his first turn which is metaphorical representative is produced by I-I-Iing the trait for *empathy /solidarity* in his disposition (the path of D-to-Trait) informed by the background knowledge that *A is interested in proverbial discourse* with the **contextual** lingual action of A – the path of Centre of D-to-the Centre of C – (*It is good that we have come this way by an initiating move and a representative speech act*) and reacting to it by a supporting move in the form of a proverbial representative (assertive) speech act (**lingual action**) – the path of the Centre of D –through C-q-D – to- the Centre of Lingual Action; again from the speech act –to- R in the Speech Act satellite network. So *B I-I-Ied his trait of solidarity – with- the contextual action of an initiated representative speech act and then desired to support the move of A by a proverbial representative speech act; and so recalled from his cultural knowledge the appropriate and polite proverb to fulfill his desire and performed the proverbial lingual action. By doing so, he constructed his proverbial dispositional reality and experienced the results of his action with pleasure.* He succeeded in doing this by **automatically** interconnecting-interrelating all these steps in an interdependent network like a flash of current flowing through a series of connections in an electric circuit from Disposition as shown in a simple basic network as Network 5 for want of space.



B could have reacted *in any way* according to *the probability theory*, but he reacted in *this specific way* by *choosing* a supporting move to **initiate and construct** the exchange through a *proverbial type of indirect, assertive, metaphorical, simple, micro-main speech act which is single and non-performative in a PE* because he made a *dispositional choice* to use a proverb *to please me in standard polite language* – even though he does not use proverbs in general - since I am doing research on proverbs and since he is *sympathetic*. He chooses to do this in a similar process as mentioned above and ends his turn. Thus, *the choice of the type* of an indirect speech act, and a standard polite proverb in this context in **that order** [of Main Speech Act by A in which the proposition is completed (Pc) by the Primary Knower (K1) followed by another MSA in the second turn by B (**Continuation**) in which the proposition is supported by a proverb (PPs) and further followed up by A by an expressive speech act (**Continuation**) whose proposition is completed by B to finally **stop** the turn and end the exchange – in Berry's terms (1981)] are dispositionally driven and *altered* the structure of discourse by a *support move* instead of a *follow up* or a *challenge* - he could have simply said:

a. Oh, yes / It's alright / Good. Another sight / etc. or

b. Why did you not cross-check the route before coming? / Why do you waste money like this? or But *look before you leap* (a censure through a proverb), etc.

A is surprised that B used a proverb (because A knows that B does not use proverbs regularly or often and so expresses his surprise by a direct, expressive, simple, non-performative, single, micro-main speech act. This follow up turn would not have taken place without *background knowledge* and without an inclination to comment on this deviation in his speech – normally, he would have opted for a non-proverbial speech act. Actually, I did not intend it as a question (elicitation) but he replied to it as one because of the multifunctionality in proverbial speech acts: he *was dispositionally impelled* to defend his action and so wanted to give the reason by completing the proposition: *Because of you*. Also, B offers the reason and justifies his use of a proverb to express solidarity with me. Since a proverbial speech act is used along with normal speech acts, a proverbial exchange is created.

Incidentally, this exchange provides explicit proof of how disposition generates-specifies-directs-materializes an exchange: had A not felt apologetic, he would not have initiated the exchange; and had B not felt sympathetic and solidarity, he would not have used a proverb. Also, this and any other exchange gives support to the definition of a proverb by giving the solid proof of the essential and uncommon characteristics of a proverb: culturally confirmed frozen textuality; and the prototype-categorical instantiation of social praxis (see Bhuvaneshwar 2003). Hence, in the construction of an exchange, disposition plays a critical role in qualifying the entire lingual action as this and that move, speech act, turn, and exchange to be so and so speech act, turn, and exchange in such and such manner. This is done through the activation of the basic components of traits-knowledge (physical-mental-cultural-linguistic)-va:sana complex of his svabha:vam which filters through the pragmatic constraints to produce dispositional cogneme-cognition of lingual action as described in TGCA Graph1 (p.6) and captured in the Network 3.

Had there been no influence of proverbial dispositional choices, the entire exchange would have been something like the following:

(1b) A (Me): It is good that we have come this way.

B (Robin Fawcett): Oh, yes/ Okay. It's alright. / (Keep Quiet)

Hence, disposition generates, specifies, directs, materializes and impels the use of a speech act in discourse and thereby controls the structure as well as the very choice of speech acts in discourse.

In another example (1c), we see how the choice of speech acts and further the structure of discourse are influenced by disposition for the same type of an assertive (representative) speech act. [Note: capital letters D, N, T, and L below denote retroflexion of the concerned phonemes.]

(1c) A: KrishNuDi meLLo: unnaji ni: dzapama:lalu.

Krishna of neck in are your rosaries

“Your rosaries are around Krishna's (the idol's) neck.”

B: illa: undi na: batuku.  
 like this is my life  
*"My life is like this."*  
 ujjallo: pillaNNeTTukoni u:ranta vetikindani  
 cradle in child keeping town all searched that  
 edurugunDa peTTukuni illanta: vetukutunna:nu.  
 in front keeping house all searching I am  
*"Like keeping the child in the cradle, searching all the town,  
 "Keeping (the rosaries) in front, I am searching all the house."*

In (1c), we have a representative speech act like that in (1) but the reply is different. It is not a simple acknowledgement, but a comment on B's behavior in terms of a proverb – she has categorized her social practice in terms of a prototypical practice standardized through a proverb. Even then, she has modified the proverb by using *ujja:llo*: 'in the cradle' instead of the usual *voLLo*: 'in the lap'. What is more, the proverb does not occur as an independent sentence (P1 form) but as an embedded clause (P2 form). It is born out of the trait of self-criticism.

In (1d), a proverb comes at the end of B's turn because B always construes social praxis through proverbs – it is a part of her grammar: a personality trait and *va:sana* (internalized habit).

A: puvvulu ti:se:ste: vigraham bo:siga: vundi.  
 flowers removing idol bald is  
*"By removing the flowers, the idol looks bald."*  
 B: mari vunDadu. manishe:na: ante:, alankaraNa ti:se:ste:.  
 indeed will it not be man even like that decoration removing  
*"Indeed, won't it be. Even a man is like that, if decoration is removed."*  
 anni: peDite: Bommakka; anni: ti:ste: Timmakka.  
 all putting Doll-Sister (Beautiful); all removing Timma-sister (Ugly)  
*"Fully decorated, it is a Doll-Sister; (if) stripped of decoration, it is Timma-sister."*

The same is the case with other types of speech acts also. Let us take a few elicitation as a test case and see how disposition influences the choice of the speech acts and further the emergent structure of discourse.

(3a). A: mi : ru ha : rsu raiDingki ra:le:de: ?  
 you horse riding to come not i.m.  
*"Why did you not come for horse-riding?" [i.m. imperative marker]*  
 B: buDDiki savurle:du ga:ni koTTam lo: di:pam peData : nanna:TTa.  
 bottle to oil not (then) but cattle hut in light put will said that  
*"There is no oil for the (small lamp) bottle but he said that he will put a (big lamp)  
 in the cattle hut (shed)"*

In this Telugu proverbial Inform/Elicit (I/E) exchange (3a), the choice of the proverbial speech act is dispositionally driven as an alternative way of saying the same thing: "Sorry, I don't have money but I wanted (foolishly) to come for horse-riding and I couldn't make it / I could not come, because I don't have money." The sequence of the emergent discourse is also controlled by giving a *response* to the question instead of a *challenge* like "Must I come for horse-riding?" (since the elicitation is tinged with *censure*) or simply *silence* to evade a truthful reply that causes *loss of face*.

In a similar type of elicitation exchange in Telugu, the interlocutor B wants to *censure* A and she uses a proverb to do so unlike in the above exchange where B wants to *censure* himself. Hence, it is the dispositional choice that triggered the reply as well as the choice of the proverb.

(3b): A: sraevaNa pu:rNimeppuDu?  
 SraevaNa Pu:rNima when  
*"When is SraevaNa PurNima (the fullmoon day in August on which a holy  
 thread is worn above the left shoulder across the chest and the belly by the*

*Hindus)?”*

B: ippuDe: pra:rambhamajindi.

Now just beginning over

*“Just now, (the month of SraevaNa) started.”*

va:kilda:Ti va:raNa:s(i) entadu:ramanna:TTa

house crossing Va:raNa:s(i) how far said he that

*“Crossing the house, one said how far is Va:raNasi?”*

VaraNa:si (Benares), the holy city in India, is very far from Andhra Pradesh and people used to go on foot for pilgrimage by travelling for a long time. B wanted to mean that SraevaNa Pu:rNima is very far and A is already asking when it is as if it were in a few days.

In (3c), there is a rhetorical counter question to the elicitation followed by indirect explanation.

(3c) A: mi:ru ku:Da: riserchi che:stunna:ra:?

you also research doing sir?

*“Are you also doing research, sir?”*

B: guDDi kannu teriste: ne:mi? mu:ste: ne:mi?

blind eye opening what if? closing what if?

*“Of what use is by opening or closing the blind eye”*

ne:nu retairajipojananDi. e:do intrestu.

I retire over sir something interest

*“I have retired, sir. Some interest.”*

In (3d), there is no such censure but a usual factual reply in a normal sentence.

(3d) A: SraevaNa Pu:rNimeppuDu?

SraevaNa Pu:rNima when

*“When is SraevaNa PurNima?”*

B: vachche: nela.

coming month

*“Next month.”*

In all these elicitations, the reply is dispositionally generated, specified, directed and used and thus the choice of the type of the speech act is not solely in a fixed pattern. What is more, the discourse structure is dispositionally fashioned out. For example, in (3c), the answer should be a *yes or no* in normal conversation in the Question/Answer adjacency pair pattern but it is not so. B used a rhetorical question type proverb to reply, altering *the propositional content and the syntactic structure also*. His nagging unhappiness about not doing his Ph.D. and not becoming big is expressed through the conscious dispositional use of the proverb first and then the answer indirectly.

#### IV. Conclusion

From the above analysis, we understand that sequentiality in discourse is not only linked to what speech act utterances convey but also to the speech act selection made by the Speaker / Hearer *dispositionally*. In addition, the choice of the speech acts and their propositional content, for example, between direct and indirect speech acts or between an assertive and a question, and the textual composition of the speech act, for example, a proverb or a non-proverbial utterance in taboo or standard language also contribute to the emergent sequence of discourse. Furthermore, such choices at a higher delicacy are dependent on the dispositional psychological state and cognitive *character* of S/H. He may be co-operative, non-co-operative or neutral in his reply; he may like to use a proverb or no proverb, polite or rude language, straight forward or round about or confused explanation in his reply. All these differences affect the coherence and sequence in discourse. Therefore, speech act theory should be supplemented with further conditions on intentionality *for* speech acts in addition to intentionality *in* speech acts. In order to do so, one should seek a dispositional sociocognitive linguistic approach to speech acts (as outlined in the Ka:rmik Linguistic Theory - see Bhuvanewar 2010a, b, c for more details - to find out how they are: 1. perceived; 2. created; 3. textualized; and 4. used in context. Fur-

thermore, we should also note that Speech Act Theory needs to be supplemented by *pragmatics* (for understanding indirect speech acts) and *ethnography of communication* (for gaining cultural knowledge to know the meaning contextually). Finally, *The Principle of Expressibility*: “The principle that whatever can be meant can be said” is further extended to cover its *causality* and restated in the Ka:rmik Linguistic theory as the *Principle of Ka:rmik Experientiality: Whatever can be meant can be said but whatever is meant and said is meant dispositionally for the construction of one’s dispositional reality through speech acts*.

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