

UDC 809.11

Hyderabad University (India)
 Second Ph.D.,
 Professor of the Institute of
 the English and Foreign languages
 e-mail: bhuvanesvarc@yahoo.com











Chilukuri Bhuvaneshwar

DERIVATION OF REFERENTIAL MEANING IN PROVERBS 2 - SYNTACTIC MEANING OF COMPLEX SPEECH ACTS: A KA:RMİK LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

The derivation of meaning in proverbs is a complex tristratal process which involves the derivation of the referential meaning of the proverb; its prototypical meaning, and finally its contextual meaning. In this second article in continuation to the first article on the Derivation of Referential Meaning 1 - Propositional Meaning: A Ka:rmik Linguistic Analysis (2009), an attempt has been made to study the syntactic meaning of complex speech acts in proverbs from a ka:rmik linguistic perspective. Complex illocutionary acts which are illocutionary denegation, conditional illocutionary acts, conjunction of illocutionary acts are taken up for discussion in this article. In this perspective, asyntactic meaning emerges out of a pattern - as it is dispositionally interpreted by the creators of a proverb and subsequently comprehended by its hearers - by virtue of its inherent relationship with abstract speech action in the construction of proverbial dispositional (ka:rmik) reality. It is **an emergent experiential (ka:rmik) awareness** resulting from the I-I-I (interconnected-interrelated-interdependent) networking of the form-content-function-style-context levels of the contextual (proverbial) actional reality through its syntactic appeal by (formal-functional-aesthetic) structure and analogy. Such a shift in paradigm opens up a new way of deriving meaning of proverbs and language as language for individual experience (**ka:rmik pragmatics** or **ka:rmatiks**) instead of language for communication (as **semantics**) or language in use for social communication (**pragmatics**).

Key words: syntactic meaning, complex sentences, complex illocutionary acts, illocutionary denegation, conditional illocutionary acts, conjunction of illocutionary acts, ka:rmatiks, ka:rmik reality.

Symbols Used in the Article

- | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
|  | <i>i-i-i network node</i> ; | ∇ | reflected in (like a quality); |  | <i>gives rise to by transformation</i> ; |
| \rightarrow | <i>leads to in the direction of the arrow</i> ; |  | |  | <i>apparently transforms into</i> ; |
| \wedge | <i>reflected on (like an adjunct)</i> ; |  | <i>impacts on</i> |  | <i>delink</i> ; |
| \Rightarrow | <i>intracategorially leads to as opposed to</i> | \leftrightarrow | <i>intra-categorially leads to</i> | | |
|  | <i>a:nushangikally gives rise to</i> ; | Σ | <i>is analyzed</i> ; | \Rightarrow | <i>through the means of</i> |
|  | <i>connecting node in a cyclic network</i> ; | \Downarrow | <i>superimposed on</i> ; | | |
| • | <i>heart or nucleus of the circular/cyclic network</i> ; |  | <i>inherently qualified</i> ; | | |
| ☆ | <i>the individual consciousness (soul or the ji:va)</i> ; |  | <i>reversal of order</i> | | |
| Δ | <i>the triad of qualities [sattva (luminosity/cognitivity) giving knowledge of activity; rajas (activity or analyticity) giving choice and pattern of activity by traits; and tamas (inertia</i> | | | | |

or substantivity) giving inertia or materiality of activity by va:sana:s] of Disposition.

I. Introduction

In the *Derivation of Referential Meaning 1- Propositional Meaning: A Ka:rmik Linguistic Analysis*, an attempt has been made to derive the propositional meaning of literal, restricted (subject specific) and figurative proverbs by examining such figurative proverbs as similitic, hyperbolic, paradoxical and metaphorical proverbs. In addition, the formation of metaphorical proverbs is motivated from such concepts as the principle of least effort, complexity in prototypicalization, ease in the computation of meaning, and aesthetic appeal. This is with reference to their propositional meaning from the perspective of their style. There is another area that is also worth consideration, namely, meaning emerging from a syntactic pattern as it becomes the site for the formation of a new or syntactically analogical proverb instead of its proposition by a reversal of order owing to its formal, functional and aesthetic appeals.

In this article, an attempt has been made to examine how such meaning in complex speech act structure inspires new proverbs and facilitates quicker comprehension of their meaning.

II. Literature Review

A large volume of literature is available on the derivation of meaning in proverbs (see Mieder 1982, 90, 93 for extensive references). However, their meaning is not derived from *a tristratal (referential, prototypical, and contextual meaning) perspective* as in the Ka:rmik Linguistic Paradigm. In the general literature on semantics and pragmatics, proverbs as a special topic have not been studied extensively. For example, in Lyons (1979 a, b), Vanderveken (1990, 91), and Searle (1969, 79 a, b) which are seminal works on semantics and pragmatics, no specific chapters are allocated to discuss the meaning of proverbs as a genre. Leech (1983) examines and analyses meaning in a Gricean perspective and extends it to his own means-ends model by adapting the Hallidayan metafunctions of language (interpersonal, ideational, and textual). In Bhuvaneshwar (2000 a-d), an attempt has been made to study the semantics of proverbs from a formal linguistic perspective and integrate it into the ka:rmik linguistic perspective of considering meaning as dispositional, experiential (ka:rmik) meaning. Such a motivation is further supported by proverbial discourse analysis (Bhuvaneshwar 1999, 2012, 2013) and general discourse analysis (Schiffrin 1994; Berry 1981 a, b, c). In this paradigm, the meaning of proverbs is derived from their tristratal perspective in a cause-means-effect analysis and integrated into *a unified experiential meaning* of the proverb used in a context. In such a perspective, meaning is not complete unless and otherwise all the formal, functional, and semantic planes as well as the cognitive, sociocultural/spiritual, and contextual actional realities of the concerned lingual action (proverbial action) are integrated into a unified experiential meaning.

The formal, functional, and cognitive linguistic models are *atomic* and therefore inadequate to provide such a description. *In a Ka:mik Linguistic perspective, meaning is an emergent (w)holistic experiential awareness: it is born out of dispositional understanding mediated through the I-I-I (interconnected-interrelated-interdependent) networking of the formal, functional, and semantic levels of the contextual (lingual) actional reality for the construction of dispositional reality and its ultimate experience as ka:rmik reality.* In such a process, meaning is dispositionally generated, specified, directed, and materialized through its systematic and holarchical mediation through the cognitive and sociocultural/spiritual realities in its context of lingual action. In *(w)holism*, cause-means-effect are all networked as a single homogeneous cognemic unit as opposed to holism wherein only the (formal) whole is considered. Hence, the ka:rmik linguistic paradigm integrates all these planes into a unified framework and therefore it is claimed that it is better suited to derive the meaning in a single framework.

Vanderveken (ibid.) is a seminal work that considers language from a general semantics perspective and studies the speech acts from that perspective. In a similar way, Lyons (ibid.) is also an important contribution towards understanding the nature of meaning. However, in both

these works, proverbs are not dealt with. Therefore, there is a need to study proverbs from the semantic perspective and see the differences between ordinary language and proverb-language.

In this paper, an attempt has been made to initiate discussion from a general semantics perspective and offer leads towards a ka:rmik pragmatic (*ka:rmatic*) derivation of meaning in proverbs.

III. Syntactic Meaning in Proverbs: Its Derivation

There are two important areas in proverbial syntax that demand a semantic-pragmatic-ka:rmatic analysis: 1. Syntactic Parallelism; 2. Complex Speech Acts. Owing to constraints of space, only complex speech acts in proverbs are taken up for a proverbial linguistic analysis.

3. 1. Syntactic Meaning of Complex Speech Acts in Proverbs

In the syntax of proverbs, a number of examples of simple and complex sentences are observed. All of them are not elementary speech acts. Therefore, their meaning may be *denegational*, *conditional*, or *conjunctive* according to their semantic interpretation.

3. 1. 1. An Illocutionary Denegation, according to Vanderveken (1990: 24), is

“to make explicit the non-performance by the speaker of

(1) an illocutionary act F (P) and is given by the form F (P)”. ⊐

For example, *a refusal* is an illocutionary denegation of *an acceptance*; *permission* is an illocutionary denegation of *forbidding*, etc. Such an illocutionary denegation in proverbs has to be similarly interpreted as a complex speech act. For example, the proverb *Better be idle than badly employed* is an illocutionary denegation of an act of advising the hearer to be (badly) employed.

A few more examples are given below from Mieder (1992).

Set.1: Illocutionary Denegation in Proverbs

- i. **Don't** rush the cattle. (simple sentence with a complex speech act;
forbidding of rushing the cattle is a denegation)
- ii. **Don't** cry over spilt milk. (simple sentence with a complex speech act;
forbidding of crying over spilled milk is a denegation)
- iii. **Don't** monkey with the bandwagon **if** you can't play the horn.
(complex sentence with negative conditional illocutionary denegation)
- iv. You can never tell about women, **but if** you can, you should **not**.
(complex sentence with positive contrastive conditional illocutionary denegation)
- v. Ask me no questions **and** I will tell you **no** lies.
(complex sentence with conditional illocutionary denegation by implication)
- vi. **Judge not** of men or things at first sight.
(simple sentence; *forbidding of judging* men or things at first sight is a denegation)

These types of proverbs have *a purpose of making explicit the non-performance of an illocutionary act F(P)*. [Here, compound sentences are treated as a part of complex sentences.]

In the formation of these proverbs, a social practice that is **perceived by choice** is *analyzed and evaluated* and then a guideline has been suggested to conduct living for its experience. This guideline is an illocutionary denegation of a generally observed practice – born out of experience: *experience informs knowledge and knowledge leads to inclinations and traits (via experience)*. This guideline is **chosen** to be a proverb and a **syntactic form** has been further **chosen** to express this proposition as *an imperative with a negative marker*. For example, *crying over milk getting spilled* is a social practice in the English society. *First*, this practice is perceived by a dispositional choice of that practice; *second*, it is chosen to be the content for a proverb by its *salience* and further a guideline is created by its *illocutionary denegation*; *third*, a syntactic form has been assigned to this denegation as *an imperative with a negative marker*; *fourth*, it is *standardized by Individual-Collective-Contextual-Conjunction* of that form with that

meaning with that *style* including *aesthetic appeal* and *function*; and *finally*, it has been used, transmitted, and perpetuated in the society. In other words, this semantic pattern of illocutionary denegation is *dispositionally chosen* because of a liking for its contentual (propositional), formal, functional, stylistic and aesthetic appeal for making explicit the non-performance of a common social illocutionary act and so gains that syntactic meaning.

3. 1. 2. A Conditional Illocutionary Act, according to Vanderveken (1990: 24), performs **(2) an illocutionary act F (Q), not categorically but on the condition that a proposition P is true and is given by the form [P F (Q)].** →

For example, in the proverb *If the beard were all, the goat might preach*, the speech act of *the preaching of the goat (F (Q))* is conditional on the proposition P that *the beard were all* is true. In the proverb, *Make yourself honey and the flies will devour you*, the assertive speech act: *the flies will devour you* is conditional on *making yourself honey*: if you don't make yourself honey, the flies will not devour you.

A few more examples are given below from Mieder (1992). The conditions are shown in *italics* and the speech acts in plain letters.

Set 2: Conditional Illocutionary Acts in Proverbs

- i. Fly your kite *when it's windy*.
- ii. Live your life, do your work, *then take your hat*.
- iii. *When a man's coat is threadbare*, it is easy to peck a hole in it.
- iv. It's too late to close the well *after the goat has fallen in*.
- v. *When in anger*, say the alphabet.
- vi. *If you can't beat them*, join them.

[The italicized subordinate clauses in i, iii – vi are conditions for performing the actions mentioned in the main clauses; in ii, *then* is a time relater which shows a time-relationship subsequent to a given time of reference of living (your life) and doing (your work); taking your hat can be done only *after* fulfilling the condition of living your life, and doing your work.]

The formation of these conditional illocutionary proverbs also follows a similar process as observed above in the case of illocutionary denegation proverbs. In these proverbs, a social practice that is **perceived** by **choice** is *analyzed and evaluated* and then a guideline has been suggested through these proverbs to conduct living for its experience. This guideline is a conditional illocutionary act of a generally observed practice – born out of experience: *experience informs knowledge and knowledge leads to inclinations and traits (via experience)*. This guideline is **chosen** to be a proverb and **a syntactic form** has been further **chosen** to express this proposition as an *imperative with a condition*. For example, *flying kites* is a social practice in the English society and it has been observed that kites don't fly well if there is no wind. *First*, this practice is perceived by choice; *second*, it is chosen to be the content for a proverb by making it conditional that in order to fly kites it should be windy; *third*, a syntactic form has been assigned to this conditional illocutionary act as an *imperative with a conditional marker* such as *when, then, after, and if*. Hence, this pattern gains a syntactic meaning of the occurrence of a social practice on a condition: *Do X when Y* and becomes the site for the formation of a proverb by the reversal of order from a proposition to a syntactic pattern. This pattern might have been gleaned from general usage by its *brevity or aesthetic appeal* or from an already formed proverb by *analogy* at a later time. To explain further, generally, a proverb is formed from the observation of a social practice and its consequent embodiment in a syntactic pattern and structure which is further embodied by a selected form (phonetic, phonological, and lexical embodiment). But here, a proverb is formed from observing a syntactic pattern instead of a proposition by reversal of order of conceptualization: the syntactic pattern of *Strike while the iron is hot* (first cited in 1386 in Chaucer's *Tale of Melibee*) might have been chosen for its appeal and it later inspires *Strike while your employer has a big contract (recent distribution)*.

3. 1. 3. In Conjunctions of Illocutionary Acts, according to Vanderveken (1990: 24), **(3) two illocutionary acts $F_1 (P_1)$ & $F_2 (P_2)$ are performed and are of the form $F_1 (P_1)$ & $F_2 (P_2)$** . For example, in the proverb *You scratch my back; I scratch your back*, there is a conjunction of two illocutionary acts *You scratch my back* ($F_1 (P_1)$) and *I scratch your back* ($F_2 (P_2)$). The first one is an elementary directive and the second one is an assertion.

Set 3: Conjunction of Illocutionary Acts in Proverbs

- i. If anyone betrays you once, it's his fault; if he betrays you twice, it's your fault.
- ii. The early bird catches the worm – but who wants worms?
- iii. Throw a stone in the shit and it splashes on your face. [It is also a Telugu proverb.]
- iv. Give me liberty or give me death.
- v. If ignorance is bliss, why be otherwise?
- vi. The husband is the head of the house, but the wife is the neck - and the neck moves the head. (see Mieder 1992)

The formation of these proverbs with conjunction of illocutionary acts also follows a similar process as observed above in the case of illocutionary denegational proverbs. In these proverbs, a social practice that is **perceived** by **choice** is *analyzed and evaluated* and then a guideline has been suggested through these proverbs – generally, in the second proposition: *if he betrays you twice, it's your fault; but who wants worms?; etc.* to conduct living for its experience. This guideline is a conjunctive illocutionary act of a generally observed practice – born out of experience: *experience informs knowledge and knowledge leads to inclinations and traits (via experience)*. This guideline is **chosen** to be a proverb and **a syntactic form** has been further **chosen** to express this proposition as *an imperative with a condition in conjunction with another condition: If anyone betrays you once, it's his fault*. For example, *getting betrayed* is a social practice in the English society. *First*, this practice is perceived by choice; *second*, it is chosen to be the content for a proverb by making it conjunctive; *third*, a syntactic form has been assigned to this conditional illocutionary act as an imperative with a conditional marker such as *when, then, after, and if* but it is in the form of two clauses conjoined by a semi-colon (ellipted conjunction *but*).

Conjunctive illocutionary acts can be *homogeneous or heterogeneous*. If all the acts in the utterance belong to the same category, they can be called homogeneous; otherwise, they are heterogeneous. For example, in **(4) If anyone betrays you once, it's his fault; if he betrays you twice, it's your fault, both the first (If anyone betrays you once, it's his fault) and the second (if he betrays you twice, it's your fault) illocutionary acts are similar conditional illocutionary acts ($P_1 \rightarrow F_1 (Q_1)$) and ($P_2 \rightarrow F_2 (Q_2)$) respectively**. In the second example, the first: *the early bird catches the worm* is an elementary assertive speech act ($F (P)$) and the second: *but who wants worms?* is a negative rhetorical question. Vanderveken (1990: 149) considers questions as requests (directives) but rhetorical questions are not requests – they are positive or negative questions giving negative or positive assertions; so also challenges are not. Hence questions of this type are not considered directives. In the case of the third example, both a directive and an assertive are conjoined. So both the examples ii and iii are heterogeneous conjunctive speech acts. The fourth example is a conjunctive illocutionary speech act with two elementary directives conjoined. In view of the examples i and iv, we get a further division of complex illocutionary acts: 1. *Conjunction of Elementary Illocutionary Acts*; 2. *Conjunction of Complex Illocutionary Acts*; and 3. *Conjunction of Mixed Illocutionary Acts*. Therefore, any proverb whose meaning is to be derived is also dependent on the nature of the speech act it represents as a sentence-in-context. If the speech act representation is not given the appropriate semantic interpretation via syntax, there is a danger of the failure of the speech act and hence the proverb. For example, in iii, *'the splashing of the shit'* – an assertion – will be true only if the

directive 'Throw a stone in the shit' is carried out. In this proverb, 'Throw a stone in the shit' is not a condition and therefore it is not a conditional speech act but a conjunctive speech act in cause-effect relation. As such a failure to interpret it as a conditional speech act leads to a misunderstanding of the proverb. Syntax helps in such cases for clarifying meaning.

Look at the following hypothetical conversations to understand the misunderstanding of meaning.

- (5) i. A: I have quarreled with that useless man and he maligned my name.
B: (You) Throw a stone in the shit and it splashes on your face. (Assertion)
- ii. A: I want to tell him what nonsense he has been talking about me.
B: (If you) Throw a stone in the shit, (and) it splashes on your face.
[Implicature: Advice or warning: Don't tell him... because he is vilifying.]

In the case of *Give me liberty or give me death*, there is a condition in *Give me liberty* and not an optional directive (as in *Give me coffee or (give me) tea*).

Sometimes in a conjunctive illocutionary act, there may be more than one *propositional constituent* (i.e., more subjects) as in *A woman, a dog, and a walnut tree: the more they are beaten, the better they will be* (first cited in 1581, *Guazzo, Civile Conversation*). As a sentence-in-a context in a *possible world*, not all the three possible constituents may be present together – only one may be present as it usually happens in *the actual world*. In such cases, the other constituents become redundant and the meaning flouts Gricean maxims of relevance and quantity and a new meaning is out of context. Then, how do we derive the meaning? The only way out is to consider all the atomic propositions as forming a single compound proposition at a higher level abstraction and then apply it at the individual level in a *comparative sense*: A dog, a woman, and a walnut tree are the categories of a prototypical concept X (stretching across animals, humans, and trees) which have the characteristic of becoming better by being beaten and so become exemplars *par excellence* of X. Therefore, the prototypical meaning is: *X becomes better by beating* with X having A, B, and C as its categories in a comparative relation. Hence, when this proverb is applied to a context where only B is the focus, and A and C are not present or relevant, there is no flouting of quantity or relevance since A, B, and C separately represent the prototype as its categories and not collectively; they need not be the focus together. What it means is: *A woman will be better by beating* (as a dog and a walnut tree will be). Another example is: *Gold, women, and linen should be chosen by daylight*. However, in *There are three sides to every story - your side, my side, and the right side*, all the three propositional constituents are present when it is told. Nonetheless, two propositional constituents are always present (*your side, my side*) but the third (*the right side*) may be optional because both the sides may be wrong and the right side may not be known.

A few examples of such proverbs are given below from Mieder (1992).

Set 4: Compound Propositions in Proverbs


- i. Feed a cold and starve a fever. (Contrast)
- ii. Men build houses; women build homes. (Contrast)
- iii. Make all you can, save all you can, give all you can. (Anticlimax: make, save, give)
- iv. If you are an anvil, hold still; if you are a hammer, strike hard. (Contrast)
- v. First love, last love, best love. (Climax)
- vi. Haste makes waste, waste makes want, want makes a poor boy a beggar.
(Anticlimax: waste, want, poor boy, beggar)
- vii. For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; for want of a horse, the rider was lost. (Anti-climax: nail, shoe, horse, rider)

The first example *Feed a cold and starve a fever* is based on a contrast of feeding and starving and is *subject specific* with two different specific subjects. So when the prototype has to be constructed we have a problem: what common abstraction can be made out of such sentences?

Feed a cold F_1 (P_1) and *starve a fever* F_2 (P_2) are common only as directives making the conjunction homogeneous. Hence, the prototype should be a directive. However, the senses are different but they should be one. The only way out is to consider cold and fever as two sicknesses and have *sickness* as a proposition in the prototype. *Feeding* and *starving* are degrees of eating as *a contrasting medicine* to cure the specific sicknesses of cold and fever; so *contrastive eating* becomes another propositional constituent. Combining the two, we get: *eat proportionately to cure the sicknesses cold (by eating more) and fever (by not eating at all)* as the prototypical meaning with F_1 (P_1) and F_2 (P_2) as the two subject specific categories restricting *the domain of application* only to those two categories. When applied in a context of F_1 (P_1) or F_2 (P_2), only one category is applicable in contrast with the second category but both constitute the prototypical meaning. Hence, the contextual meaning is derived with reference to the category pointed out in the context: (The directive is to) 1. feed a cold in contrast to starve a fever when cold is referred to; or 2. starve a fever in contrast to feed a cold when fever is referred to.

In the case of climax or anticlimax, all the atomic propositions have to be combined to make the whole. For example, the prototypical meaning of *Make all you can, save all you can, give all you can* is derived by joining *make + save + give* to get an abstract practice of *dealing* (with money) and linking it with the adverbial clause *all you can* present in all the three atomic propositions: *deal with money according to your ability*; so also in the case of *For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; for want of a horse, the rider was lost*, the progressive effect of losing a bigger thing for want of a smaller thing is extended to the biggest thing and the cumulative effect from the smallest to the biggest thing is taken into consideration through the anticlimax for deriving the prototypical meaning: *for want of a very small thing, a very big thing is lost*.

The different types of complex speech acts are shown in the following network (1) for a quick reference.



Network 1: Network of Complex Illocutionary Acts

In all these proverbs, conjunction of illocutionary acts is tied up with specific syntactic patterns and they become sites for specific syntactic meanings which inspire proverbs by dispositional creativity via the principle of Reversal of Order from propositional meaning to syntactic meaning. This is very much seen in syntactic parallelism in figures of speech such as climax and anticlimax (cf. iii, vi, and vii in Set 4: Compound Propositions in Proverbs above).

IV. Summary and Conclusion

In the above sections, we have discussed three types of syntactic meaning in complex illocutionary acts: 1. Syntactic Meaning in Denegational Acts; 2. Syntactic Meaning in Conditional Acts; and 3. Syntactic Meaning in Conjunctional Acts. These types can be satisfactorily motivated using the ka:rmik linguistic principles and techniques of dispositional cognition and I-I-I networking.

Let us motivate these types in the following paragraphs.


4. 1. Syntactic Meaning of Complex Sentences (Proverbs): Their Motivation in the Ka:rmik Linguistic Paradigm (KLP)

In our earlier discussion of the complex illocutionary speech acts, we have given 4 sets of examples for their three types. Let us take one example from each set and see how the ka:rmik linguistic paradigm provides a principled motivation of their meaning.

4. 1. 1. Motivation of Syntactic Meaning of Illocutionary Denegation in Proverbs


In Bhuvaneshwar (2009), it has been observed that for any proverb to be created, *first*, the *propositional meaning* is arrived at by the observation of sociocultural practice of a particular phenomenon – there is an underlying dispositional choice in focusing the attention on that particular phenomenon as *salient* for the observation to take place. This sociocultural practice is the heart of the proverb as its content. Once this sociocultural practice has been cognized and *second*, *chosen* as the *content* of the proverb (to be evolved in course of time by prototype-categorical instantiation into a culturally frozen text), it is polished and standardized in its use by the individual-contextual-collective conjunction of its application. As it is polished and standardized, *third*, its *form* (patterned structure) is decided by collective choice.

In each and every stage of the evolution of a proverb, choice always comes into play: first, at the level of observation of the propositional meaning – to observe this meaning by choice; second, at the level of choosing this propositional meaning as the content of the proverb; third, at the level of forming the pattern, and structure at all the levels of phonology, syntax, and style of the proverb; and finally, its choice for using it in a context in discourse. We know that wherever there is a *choice*, there is a *response bias* (R.B.) generated from a *dispositional bias* (D.B.) which is a product of *disposition* functioning as *the Means* (in *potential-kinetic-synoptic stages*). Therefore, we can say that these proverbs are dispositionally created **by** human beings **as** they live in a context to be dispositionally used **for** living in the context with that dispositionally intended meaning in a Ka:rmik Process shown in the Network II below.




Network 2: The Ka:rmik Process Network

Let us capture the choices also in a similar systemic network as follows.



Network 4. Dispositional Choices in the Formation of a Proverb

These choices are made according to an I-I-I networking of the Universal Science of Action with the Universal Science of Living through the Universal Science of Lingual action. In the case of proverbs, since language is already formed prior to their formation, living is conducted by coordinating the coordination of action through proverbs as language: proverbs are used as a resource for the construction of proverbial dispositional (ka:rmik) reality. The I-I-I network of proverbial action is shown below.



U S of [Lingual → Proverbial] Action Universal Science of Living

Network 3: The I-I Network of U S of [Action – Lingual (Proverbial) Action – Living]

All the stages of observing the propositional meaning to choosing the form mentioned above can be graphically captured in the form of the conceptualization graphs in KLT as explained below and given in Graphs 1 and 2 of Bhuvanewar (2012, 2013), reproduced below once again.


Stage 0: The Individual Being (Ji:va in Samskrit) perceives by his power of cognition a sociocultural practice and *chooses* it either for creating a proverb or using it as a proverb in a context. At this stage, his Disposition-qualified-Consciousness (D-q-C) just *observes* it *blankly* – *there is only a perception of the practice without any knowledge of it*; and disposition does not impact on the perception. It is represented by the centre of the graph with a triangle (Disposition) enclosing a star (Consciousness).


Stage 1: When Consciousness reflects in Disposition, it gets charged with awareness, as it were, and this Consciousness-qualified-Disposition (C-q-D) perceives it indeterminately as X (as *this and that social practice*). It is shown by the Disposition Quadrant I with *Traits (GunNa:s) Component* forming an interface with *Culture Component* of the World View Quadrant II; and *The Va:sana:s Component* forming an interface with *The Activity Component* of the Context Quadrant IV.

Stage 2: Then by the impact of *the knowledge* (of the phenomenal world (sociocultural knowledge) shown by the direction of *the world view - diagonal* towards the centre in the II Quadrant and uniting with the knowledge diagonal) *component* of disposition (shown by the diagonal in the I Quadrant), he *interprets* it by classification as *so and so* cultural practice of *crying over spilt milk* and *identifies* it by analysis as having *such and such* qualities as *crying over an act of milk getting spilled* – *analyticity* is the inherent characteristic of Disposition which possesses the powers of interpretation by reasoning, logic, etc., *creativity* by possessing the power of projection, *materiality* by possessing the power of materialization, and also *qualitativity* by possessing the power of choice and qualification. As he does interpretation and identification, he does so according to his *va:sana:s* (internalized habits functioning as skills) *component* of disposition, and finally *cognizes* it as a cogneme of a concept C *that it is not useful to cry over milk spilled* according to the properties of his traits as *this and not that*, as *so and not so* in *such and not such* manner in the Concept Quadrant III. This is shown by the diagonal of the Disposition Quadrant I which is *the Knowledge Component* flashing through the star-enclosed-triangle as the third diagonal Concept-Cogneme by vivartam.

Graph 1: Combined Triaxial Graphs of Cognitive Actionality Quadrants (KLT)

Legend

- ☆ The Individual Consciousness (the Being in the Human Being or the soul or the ji:va)
- △ The Triad (sattva giving knowledge of activity; rajas giving choice of activity by traits; and tamas giving inertia or materiality of activity by va:sana:s) of Disposition; D-q-C Disposition-qualified-Consciousness
- Horizontal Line; Vertical Line; Diagonal Line: Horizontal, Vertical, and Diagonal Axes;
- I, II, III, and IV : the quadrants 1, 2, 3, and 4  gives rise to; C-q-D Consciousness-qualified-Consciousness
- s 1. inner (pasyanthi ‘cognitive’); 2. medial (madhyama ‘pattern’); 3. outer (vaikhari ‘form or phonic’) levels of realization of language



a. Combined Triaxial Graphs of Cognitive Actionality (Language)

b. Tricircled Graph of Evolution of Proverbs

Stage 3: Finally the cogneme is *contentualized as a concept* which is the complex illocutionary denegational proposition (that P: *Don't cry over spilt milk*) by semiotic **representation** as shown in the following equations (6) and (7) and also the conceptual axis for a graphic representation of Conception in Graph 2 below. He makes further choices at all the levels of phonology-lexis-syntax-semantics-pragmatics-style in terms of its form. Later it is materialized by phonation as an utterance in a context either as dispositional lingual action or reaction to it in the Context Quadrant IV. As it is materialized, it is **created**. As it is created, it **initiates/coordinates** action by **communication**. Ultimately, it leads to **results and experience** as coordination of action is coordinated proverbially in a context. Here also he makes choices for its use in terms of function (by choosing appropriate speech acts) and context (by choosing the spatio-temporal-material and socio-cultural-spiritual setting). The arrow pointing towards the centre in Quadrant IV indicates how it impacts on disposition along with the world view-diagonal to facilitate the cogneme cognition of the concept. The double arrows flashing downwards from the cogneme-diagonal in Quadrant III into the centre and as the contextual (lingual) actional-diagonal in Quadrant IV show how the concept *gives rise to* and is materialized in the context as an utterance *by a categorial transformation* (↻) from a concept (an idea) into an utterance (*semiotic sound*).

(6) Awareness → Dispositional Awareness ↻ Concept ↻ Utterance


Again, the evolution of a dispositional impulsion into an un-manifest concept into a semi-manifest pattern and structure into an utterance (a quantum of sound as energy) are shown separately in the second tricircled Graph 1b. The first inner circle is the pasyanti layer of unmanifest cognition of the concept, the second layer (madhyama) is the evolved semi-manifest cognition of the pattern and structure of the concept and the outer layer (vaikhari) is the materialized form of the concept (meaning) as the form (the phono-lexico-syntactic layer).

In complex illocutionary denegation in proverbs, the same process is repeated but the source of dispositional impulsion is the syntactic prototype: **Don't/No (Negative Marker) ...X... over...Y...** of the Proverb – here **don't/not/no/never** serves the function of illocutionary denegation and X (simple /complex speech act main clause) and Y (0/complex speech act subordinate clause) as the templates for a directive speech act. The proverb maker observes this prototypical proverb and *creates* another parallel proverb by the same process of *observation-*

interpretation-identification-representation-creation and then uses it for *initiation/coordination-communication-experience* of action as described below:

(7) Perception (This and That - Cognition) ↘ Classification (So and So - System / Paradigm) ↘ Qualification (Such and Such – Structure/Syntagm) ↘ Cognition of the Propositional Meaning as Sociocultural Practice

The conceptual axis-graph has been shown here in Graph 2 once again to represent both the Objectification-Classification-Qualification process and how the propositional meaning in a proverb is created. Once the propositional meaning is chosen, it is embodied by a form. It is at this stage, the issue of syntactic meaning comes into play.



Graph 2: The Triaxial Graph of Conceptual Process in Ka:rmik Linguistic Theory (KLT)

When a proverb is formed in a particular form with a particular syntactic structure, that proverb with that syntactic structure becomes a site for observation of its propositional and syntactic features. If it is productive and also aesthetically, and functionally appealing, it will attract the attention of the proverb makers. Now by the Principle of Reversal of Order, the syntactic pattern (along with the illocutionary act) gains *saliency* (prominence) and becomes the source for analogy as a template by a *dispositional choice*. New propositions will be suitably used to *fit in that template of the syntactic pattern* and consequently new proverbs are created by a dispositional bias for that template leading to a response bias and formation of proverbs with a Complex Illocutionary Speech Act syntactic pattern in that template with/without modification.

The propositional meaning *that one should not cry over spilt milk* gives the syntactic pattern of an imperative simple sentence in the (S) V A since it is advice which denegates a practice of crying over spilled milk. This is given by the template: **Negative Marker (Don't/Never) V (A/O, etc.)**. This template gains the meaning *that one should not X ... Y* and becomes a **syntactic class (paradigm)**. It inspires analogical creativity with that syntactic meaning which in turn leads to the creation of new proverbs by filling in X and Y with new propositional content in the same structure or in different structures (**syntagm**): **Don't rush (V) your cattle (O)**. It is achieved by a *Reversal of Order* of creation of proverbs from propositions to syntactic patterns but the end product, the cogneme, is obtained in the same manner. In this process, the prototype may give rise to its categories in their variety-range-depth. Thus, we also get some examples of proverbs such as: *Never bark up the wrong tree; Never comb a bald head; Never start off on the wrong foot; Never judge before you see; Don't build your castle in the air; Don't burn your bridges behind you; Don't bite the hand that (feeds you/butters your bread);*


Don't cross the bridge till you come to it; Don't lock the chicken house after the chicken are stolen; Never do anything yourself you can get somebody else to do it; Don crow till yuh git out o' de woods, day might be uh beah behin' de las' tree; Don' take no mo' tuh yo' haht dan you kin kick offer yo' heels, etc.

(8) Propositional Meaning → Syntactic Pattern → Syntactic Template ⇄

New Propositional Meaning

Stage 4: Individual-Collective-Contextual Conjunction and Standardization (ICCCS)

Any proverb has to go through gradual evolution from its conceptualization stage to its acceptance as a proverb. The process of gradual evolution is linear. *First*, someone who has observed a social practice has to choose it and use it in discourse to construct categorial reality; *second*, that social practice has to be prototypicalized to make it a potential proverb by linear as well as parallel application of the proverb in contexts; *third*, people have to accept it and use it as



Legend: ~ transmission from to ; I Individual; C Collective; I/I Individual -to-Individual; C/I Collective -to-Individual; IPC Interpersonal Communication; IPT Interpersonal Transmission; I-to-C Individual-to-Collective; 1 Dispositional; 2 Socioculturalspiritual; 3 Contextual Actional; 4 Lingual Actional Realities

Network 5. a. Ka:rmik Network for Transmission of Language as a Dispositional Process by ICCCS;

b. I-I-I (Interconnected-Interrelated-Interdependent) Network of ICCCS

such a prototype to instantiate categorial reality in a linear, parallel, and cyclic process; and *finally*, that utterance has to be standardized and accepted as the standardized form by the proverb community in which it is used by I-I-I processing in a ka:rmik process. All these phases are executed by a simple process of the first individual entering into interpersonal communication (IPC) with another (other) individual(s) (I/I IPC) and those persons further triggering a chain reaction with other members of the society to finally spread it at the group (collective) level. Again, from the group level, the individual members trigger the application of the standard form (C/I IPC) and set up a chain reaction of transmitting the standard proverb by interpersonal transmission (C/I IPT) to the individuals. Finally, an I-I-I network is established between I/I IPC, I-to-C IPC, and (C/I IPT) as shown in the Network 5b and the proverb is evolved, applied, transmitted and preserved in the cultural memory of the proverb community.

4. 1. 2. Conditional Illocutionary Acts in Proverbs

In the case of conditional illocutionary acts also, their motivation can be made in a similar way. Let us take an example “Fly your kite *when it's windy*” and motivate its syntactic meaning. The Syntactic Paradigm (Class) for this proverb is a complex speech act (sub-class: sentence with a subordinate, adverbial conditional clause of time) with a complex proposition and its Syntagm (Structure) is a main clause followed by a subordinate clause of time joined by *when*. Conditional Proposition as a feature is already in use in General English Syntax and therefore it

becomes the site of observation. In the English society, there is a sociocultural practice of flying kites. The kites fly well when it is windy (the wind moves the kite and hovers it in the sky and when the thread is released, it is lifted up); however, when there is no wind, the kite does not hover in the sky and go up; in addition, it falls down. This contrast is *observed* and when the proverb maker is inspired by it through his dispositional creativity, he cognizes this proverb as shown in the Graphs 1 and 2 via *the syntactic pattern* and creates the potential proverb. It becomes a proverb by Individual-Collective-Contextual-Conjunction-and-Standardization as captured in the ICCCS Network 5. Once this cogneme is cognized, it is materialized as an utterance in the context in which it is cognized as shown in the Context Quadrant IV in Graph 1.


4. 1. 3. Conjunction of Illocutionary Acts in Proverbs

Let us take an example of *Feed a cold and starve a fever* (Set 4. i in this article) for illustration. The syntactic Paradigm (Class) for this proverb is a complex speech act (sub-class: complex sentence (compound sentences are included in complex sentences in Quirk's Classification)) with a compound proposition and the Syntagm (Structure) of this proverb is bi-clausal joined by a conjunction (*and*). Propositional Contrast as a feature is already in use in General English Syntax and therefore it becomes the site of observation. There is a sociocultural practice in folk medicine to put the patient with fever on fasting and feeding a patient suffering from cold. Both of them are sicknesses with a remedy that occurs in contrast. This contrast is *observed* and when the proverb maker is inspired by it through his dispositional creativity, he cognizes this proverb as shown in the Graphs 1 and 2 via *the syntactic pattern* and creates the potential proverb. It becomes a proverb by Individual-Collective-Contextual-Conjunction-and-Standardization as captured in the ICCCS Network 5. Once this cogneme is cognized, it is materialized as an utterance in the context in which it is cognized as shown in the Context Quadrant IV in Graph 1.

Once a proverb is formed and established, it is recalled and used in a context by superimposing its desired function (as an illocutionary act) with the culturally established meaning on it.

4. 2. Superimposition of Features in KLT

By multi-axial representation, a proverb's cognition can be captured as shown below in Graph 3. SCS intersects with the Disposition and colours the cognition as SCS Dispositional Cognition by *dharma:dhya:sam* (quality superimposition); again, lingual action and the subsequent choice of the proverb is superimposed on the act AA; then, its function FF is further superimposed on the proverbial action to make it a complex illocutionary act; and finally, the entire complex illocutionary action is superimposed on Consciousness (C) and it is cognized as the concerned complex illocutionary act by *vivartam* of C.



Graph 3. Multiaxial Graph of Superimposition

As the proverb is used in interpersonal communication (IPC) by an individual (I), it spreads and becomes a part of the collective cultural knowledge and then it is transmitted (IPT) by its use with the individuals in the society as explained in Stage 4: ICCCS and Transmission of the Proverb. Thus, its intended meaning is preserved and transmitted.

4. 3. Comprehension of a Proverb

In the derivation of the meaning of a proverb when it is used, a reference to the aetiology of the proverb is very important; without it, the meaning becomes either obscure or distorted or incomplete. The original intentionality has to be culturally learnt and then the meaning derived. To explain it further, *the causal attitudes* transformed into *cultural meanings* have to be understood to derive *the intended meaning* of the proverb. This intended meaning is paraphrased in the prototypical meaning of the proverb and is culturally stored. The prototypical meaning becomes the cultural knowledge of the proverb and this should be properly understood and reinforced with the background knowledge of the contextual action (discourse) and then superimposed on the utterance to derive the contextual meaning of the proverb.

In the comprehension of proverbs with parallel syntactic patterns, the syntactic pattern template will aid the quicker comprehension of the proverb by virtue of its being analogically known to the hearer. In the process of comprehension, the hearer first receives the auditory input (the utterance) by his Dispositionally-qualified-Consciousness. Later, the Consciousness-qualified-Disposition reacts to it through its knowledge of such syntactically similar proverbs and comprehends the meaning by its already established *va:sana* (internalized habit) of understanding such proverbs via the syntactic pattern; it further colours it by the traits component. The entire process of the dispositional cognition and comprehension of the proverb in the context of its use is shown in the Triaxial Graphs of Cognitive Actionality in Graph 1.

In the analysis conducted above, it has been shown how syntactic meaning is derived from the complex illocutionary acts embodied in certain syntactic patterns of proverbs using the Ka:rmik Linguistic model. The advantage of using the KLT model is that it provides *a dispositionally* causal motivation of the gradual evolution of a proverb that is explanatorily and descriptively more adequate and psychologically more valid than other atomic models. In these atomic models such as formal, functional, and cognitive linguistic models, it is difficult to motivate the *choice* of the complex illocutionary speech act in its variety-range-depth from among its alternatives as well as I-I-I the form-function-meaning- cognition-use network.

Bibliographic list

1. Berry M. Polarity, ellipticity, elicitation and propositional development, their relevance to the well-formedness of an exchange. Nottingham Linguistic Circular, 10, 1981a. - No. 1. P. 36 - 63.
2. Berry M. Systemic linguistics and discourse analysis: a multi - layered approach to exchange structure. In Studies in discourse analysis. (ed.by) Malcolm Coulthard and Martin Montgomery. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981b. P. 120 - 145.
3. Berry M. Towards layers of exchange structure for directive exchanges. Network, 2, 1981c. P. 23-32.
4. Bhuvanewar, Chilukuri. The English Proverb in I/E Exchange: A Multilayered Systemic Analysis. A Paper Presented at the First International Congress On English Grammar. Hyderabad: CIEFL, 1999.
5. Bhuvanewar, Chilukuri. Reference, Sense and Denotation in Proverbs. In Semantics of Proverbs. A Part of PhD Course Work. Hyderabad: CIEFL, 2000a.
6. Bhuvanewar, Chilukuri. Proposition in Proverbs: A Semantic Analysis. In Semantics of Proverbs. A Part of PhD Course Work. Hyderabad: CIEFL, 2000b.
7. Bhuvanewar, Chilukuri. Synonymy and Antonymy in Proverbs: A Semantic Analysis. In Semantics of Proverbs. A Part of PhD Course Work. Hyderabad: CIEFL, 2000c.
8. Bhuvanewar, Chilukuri. Figures of Speech in Proverbs: A Semantic Analysis. In Semantics of Proverbs. A Part of PhD Course Work. Hyderabad: CIEFL, 2000d.

9. Bhuvaneshwar, Chilukuri. Linguistics in Paremiology: A Plea for Proverbial Linguistics as a Special Branch. Keynote Address delivered in the Third International Colloquium on Proverbs, Tavira, Portugal, 2009.

10. Bhuvaneshwar, Chilukuri. "Speech Act Theory and Proverbial Discourse: A Karimik Linguistic Analysis", Scientific Newsletter, 2012, 2 (18).

11. Bhuvaneshwar, Chilukuri. "Proverbial Linguistics: Theory and Practice in the Karimik Linguistic Paradigm - Creation and Development of Proverbs (Fourth Part of the Plenary Speech)". In: Benayoun, Jean-Michel/Kübler, Natalie/Zouogbo, Jean-Philippe: «Parémiologie. Une identité affirmée». Actes du Colloque International de Parémiologie «Tous les chemins mènent à Paris Diderot» 29 juin au 2 juillet 2011, Volume I et II. Schneider Verlag Hohengehren. Baltmannsweiler, 2013.

12. Leech G. N. Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman Group Limited, 1983.

13. Lyons J. Semantics I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979 a.

14. Lyons J. Semantics II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979 b.

15. Mieder W. International Proverb Scholarship An Annotated Bibliography. New York: Garland Publishing, 1982.

16. Mieder W. International Proverb Scholarship An Annotated Bibliography. Supplement I (1800 –1981). New York: Garland Publishing, 1990.

17. Mieder W., Stewart A. Kingsbury and Kelsie B. Harder. A Dictionary of American Proverbs. Oxford: O.U.P., 1992.

18. Mieder W. International proverb Scholarship An Annotated Bibliography. Supplement II (1982 - 1991). New York: Garland Publishing, 1993.

19. Schiffrin D. Approaches to Discourse. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994.

20. Searle J. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

21. Searle J. Expression and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979a.

22. Searle J. "A Classification of Illocutionary Acts". In: Searle, John (1979 a), 1979b.

23. Vanderveken D. Meaning and Speech Acts Vol I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

24. Vanderveken D. Meaning and Speech Acts Vol II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.